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ARGUMENT I
SMITH'S MISINTERPRETS THE HOLDING OF
SCHNUPHASE V. STOREHOUSE MARKETS,
918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996).
Smith's argues that "the issue is still before the Court as to
whether the unsafe condition was known, or should have been known,
by exercise of reasonable care on the part of Defendant Smith's..."
(Brief of Appellee Smith's - p. 16).
Smith's then argues that there is no evidence that it knew, or
should have known, of the defect giving rise to Mrs. McKay's injury
and no evidence that Smith's could have

foreseen the danger.

Plaintiff McKay suggests that Smith's has misunderstood the holding
of the Court in Schnuphase, and that there was adequate evidence of
foreseeability presented to the Court.
Both Canfield and Schnuphase support Plaintiff's position that
the evidence presented creates an adequate question of fact as to
the foreseeability of the danger posed by Smith's behavior, and the
injury growing from the choices made by Smith's.

The Court has

asserted in Canfield that liability:
"...usually requires that the store owner, its
agents, or employees, actually create the
condition or defect that results in an injury
to a patron." Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc.,
841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) p. 1225.
The Supreme Court in Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918
P.2d 476 (Utah 1996) determined that a predicate to application of
the Canfield doctrine requires that there must be "...foreseeability of an inheritently dangerous condition" and "...that foreseeability and inherent danger are key elements of a negligence action
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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under the second theory of liability." Schnuphase 918 P.2d at 479.
In Canfield and Schnuphase, both fact situations arose from a
dangerous condition of a temporary nature. The Utah Supreme Court
made clear that situations involving unsafe conditions of a
permanent nature had different applications:
"The second class of cases involves some
unsafe conditions of a permanent nature, such
as: in the structure of the building...which
was created or chosen by the defendant (or his
agents), or for which he is responsible. In
such circumstances, where the defendant either
created the condition, or is responsible for
it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and
no further proof of notice is necessary."
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478.
That is precisely the condition which confronts Smith's. In
this instance, Smith's created the hazard by building the store, or
rather, by hiring agents which built the store on its behalf and at
its behest.

Actual notice of the defective condition is, there-

fore, not required under either Canfield or Schnuphase. However,
foreseeability of the dangerous condition is required.

The Trial

Court, therefore, should have used the second prong of reasoning
when it selected the standard used under Canfield
The

Trial

Court

erroneously

applied

the

and Schnuphase.

standard

requiring

knowledge of the defect causing the injury with no prior notice of
the defect required.
"The issue is still before the Court as to
whether the unsafe condition was not known or
should have been known by exercise of reasonable care on the part of Defendant Smith's..."
(See, TR 829 - Memorandum Decision, p. 5,
attached as Addendum #1).
The Trial Court should properly have used the standard
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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identified

in Schnuphase

- that being

foreseeability

of an

inherently dangerous condition.
Multiple instances of the foreseeability of the instrumentality of Mrs. McKay7s injury were addressed to the Trial Court and
referenced in her Brief, summarized as follows:
1.

Smith's provided the specifications for an interior door

to be utilized in an exterior application.

See, TR at 1360. The

chief engineer of the manufacturer of the door stated in his
deposition that it would be "misuse" to have installed the U.S.
Aluminum "interior use only" door in an exterior setting. See, TR
at 1304.

It is foreseeable that an injury might occur if Smith's

installed a door in a Northern Utah store taken from specifications
for a store in Central Arizona.

(See, p. 5, para. 9 of Smith's

Brief).
2.

Smith's failed to investigate why its Architect or his

predecessor had designated
exterior setting.

an interior-use only door for an

Had it done so, it might have discovered that

water drainage, frost wedges, and weights in excess of two hundred
fifty (250) pounds might cause a failure in that particular door.
It is again foreseeable that Smith's failure to require the
installation of the proper door could result in an injury when
those factors play some role in the failure of that door.

(See, TR

at 730, Affidavit of Dr. McEntyre).
3.

Smith's has admitted that it had no policies, rules,

standards and/or guidelines in effect at the time of the injury
relative to maintenance, cleaning or upkeep of the door.
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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(See, TR

at 693, 737-738).

It is foreseeable that failure to clean,

maintain, and/or provide upkeep on the door by Smith's could cause
a door to fail leading to injury of its customers. It is likewise
foreseeable that if store employees and co-workers were never
instructed to clean the grating and never cleaned the grooves of
the tracts of the threshold, that the accumulation of such debris
could lead to a failure in the door mechanism.

(See, TR at 730 and

733) .
That agents for Smith's may have failed to notify Smith's of
its obligations to implement an appropriate cleaning and maintenance program is a burden that Smith's must resolve by crossclaim
with its agents as provided by the Schnuphase standard.
4.

In that same vein, if Co-Defendant/Appellee Crittenden

Paint and Glass Company misled the general contractor, misled the
architect, and misled Smith's itself by cropping off crucial
warning language, the foreseeability of injuries growing from the
deception must remain the responsibility of the principal, to be
resolved through third party complaints and crossclaims.

(See. TR

at 1678-1679).
5.

If the architect which Smith's hired failed to apprehend

the danger of installing an interior use-only door from Central
Arizona into an exterior setting in Northern Utah, the responsibility for that failure must rest between Smith's and its agents,
without holding the injured victim hostage to any agency failures.
Unrebutted evidence was presented that the door was not fit for the
purpose intended.
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep

(See, Affidavit of Architect, Anthony Wegener,
A

TR at 454-5).

That created a question of fact precluding summary

judgment.
6.

The same may be said for the failure of the general

contractor to detect the dangers of the installation of the wrong
door, as well as the failure of the manufacturer of the door to
appropriately

warn

its

potential

customers

limitations and maintenance requirements.

of

weight-bearing

(See, TR at 1250-1251).

In no instance can it be said to fairly impose upon Mrs. McKay the
obligation to have been alerted to the failures by Smith's and its
agents.
7.

Evidence was presented at the Trial Court regarding the

negligence of each of the other co-defendants as follows:
(a)

U.S. Aluminum warned potential purchasers that the

door in question was limited to interior-use only.

However, it is

a question of fact as to whether it properly warned such purchasers
that the stainless steel cap was susceptible to deformation if not
properly cleaned and maintained, whether weight in excess of two
hundred fifty (250) pounds might cause deformation of the track
and, therefore, lead to injury

(See, TR at 1240) , or whether

exposure in a high-altitude, Northern Utah setting, might cause a
frost wedge to work the stainless steel cap off the track, leading
to a hazardous situation.
(b)

Crittenden

See, TR at 1240 and 1241.
Paint

and

Glass,

intentionally

or

otherwise, cropped the warning words "for interior applications
only" off each page submitted to the architect and the general
contractor.

See, TR at 1678 and 1679.

g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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It is a question of fact as

to whether or not supplying that warning to both the architect and
the general contractor would have made any difference in those
defendants issuing a warning to Smith's - even though Smith's may
be presumed to have understood the warning in light of its prior
approval of the door in question.
(c)

Defendant Chamberlin should have known that it would be

inappropriate to have allowed the installation of an "interior-use
only" door at an exterior site.

See, TR at 730.

It becomes a

question of fact as to whether his Nuremburg-type defense "I was
only doing what I was told" would overcome his obligation as the
General Architect ultimately responsible for the whole project.
See,

TR at 1375 and 1376.
(d)

R&O Construction hired Crittenden Paint and Glass, and

should be responsible for the negligent or intentional conduct of
its subcontractors.

See. TR at 1599.

Any allocation of liability

for the omissions of R&O Construction is within the province of the
trier of fact.
The Schnuphase Court recognized the ultimate responsibility of
the store owner in such cases when it observed:
"[The] essential element in method of operation claims is that the condition created by
the defendant is of such a character that the
defendant has or should have notice of an
inherently
dangerous
condition."
(See,
Randall v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah
1993)).
When Appellee Smith's chose the wrong door for Logan, Utah,
when it failed to investigate the risks of using the wrong door in
Logan, Utah, and failed to clean and maintain the door, it was
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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certainly foreseeable that the door might fail and create an
inherently dangerous situation for its patrons.

Responsibility

must, therefore, lie with Appellee Smith7s and its agents. Otherwise, every merchant throughout the State will attempt to create
immunity

for

itself

by

making

poor

decisions,

remaining

intentionally ignorant of the risks of its poor decisions, and have
no incentive to avoid sloppy maintenance and cleaning policies.
All such behavior would constitute insulation for the merchant from
the injuries which its poor practices might cause. Application of
such a doctrine would result in immunity from any liability
whatsoever.

Judge Low accepted that dangerous premise when he

observed:
"Under the facts here shown, Smith,s had no
reason to know of the existence of a steel
cap, much less that it might fail under
conditions of dirt, ice, debris or heavy
loads."
(See TR 831-832 - Memorandum
Decision, p. 7-8).
What the Judge failed to recall was the evidence and admissions by Smith7s itself that Smith's chose the door containing the
steel cap, Smith's chose the Architect which approved the door
having the steel cap, Smith's hired the General Contractor which
allowed the installation of the wrong door which had a steel cap,
and Smith's consented to the hiring of the subcontractor which
cropped off the evidence that the door was inappropriate for an
exterior application. It is inappropriate to insulate Smith's from
the consequences of its choices by asserting that it had no reason
to know of the existence of a steel cap which ultimately injured
Mrs. McKay.

Further, constructive knowledge of the defect in the

g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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door could reasonably be inferred from Smith7s faulty cleaning
practices.

(See, Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 486 S.E. 2d 285 (VA

1997)) .
ARGUMENT II
JUDGE LOW MISAPPLIED THE CANFIELD-SCHNUPHASE STANDARD.
In his Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1996, Judge Low
consistently misapplies the appropriate standard established by the
Court in Canfield and reaffirmed in Schnuphase. In the second line
of

cases

established

by

the

Canfield

decision,

notice

is

unnecessary if:
"...the store owner, its agents, or employees
actually create the condition or defect that
results in an injury to a patron [or] where
the store owner's method of operation creates
a situation where it is reasonably foreseeable
that the expectable acts of third parties will
create a dangerous condition or defect."
Canfield. p. 1225.
In such a circumstance where a store owner chooses such a
method of operation, the injured party "...need not prove either
actual or constructive knowledge of the specific condition."
Notice is satisfied as a matter of law because the store owner is
deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it adopted
the method of operation.
The Court indicated:
"The second class of cases involves some
unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such
as: in the structure of the building. . .which
was created or chosen by the defendant (or his
agents), or for which he is responsible. In
such circumstances, where the defendant either
created the condition, or is responsible for
it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and
no further proof of notice is ' necessary."
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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Schnuphase 918 P.2d at 479. [emphasis added]
Throughout his entire Memorandum Decision, Judge Low misapprehends that standard and seeks to impose on Mrs. McKay the
obligation of proving that Smith's knew of the underlying defect in
the door that it chose:
1.

".. .There is no showing that Smith's was aware.. .that the

door was not designated for outdoor use..."
Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 3.
2.

See, TR at 827 -

[Emphasis added.]

"There was nothing to show [that defendant knew or should

have known] that the raising of the stainless steel cap was caused
by an ice wedge..." See, TR at 827 - Memorandum Decision of Judge
Low, p. 3.
3.

[Emphasis added.]
"There is no showing that [the defendant knew or should

have known that] the track was raised as a result of dirt or heavy
use."

See TR at 827-828 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low,

p. 3-4.
4.

[Emphasis added.]
"The

landowner

is liable

for damages

resulting

in

physical harm caused to invitees by a condition of the land only if
he knows...of the condition and realizes it would involve unreasonable risk or harm to invitees."
Decision of Judge Low, p. 4-5.
5.

See TR at 828-829 - Memorandum
[emphasis added]

"The issue is still before the Court as to whether the

unsafe condition was known or should have been known by...
Smith's..." See, TR at 829 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p.
5.

[emphasis added]
6.

"What is at issue is whether defendant Smith's had an

g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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obligation to do anything other than what it did in order to be
aware of or remedy the situation."
Decision of Judge Low, p. 6.
7.

See, TR at 830 - Memorandum

[emphasis added]

"There simply is no evidence that...Smith's knew...that

installing such [an interior] door in an exterior location would
involve unreasonable risk of harm to invitees."
Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 7.
8.

See, TR at 831 -

[emphasis added]

"That dirt, ice or other contaminants '...may be the

underlying cause of the door's failure, there is no showing that
Smith's was...aware of...that risk7". See, TR at 831 - Memorandum
Decision of Judge Low, p. 7.
9.

[emphasis added]

"No warning was provided to Smith' s... that ice, dirt,

debris or heavy loads would cause...the type of damage to the door
which occurred."
Low, p. 7.

See, TR at 831 - Memorandum Decision of Judge

[emphasis added]

10.

"Smith's had no reason to know [that the steel cap] might

fail..."

See, TR at 833 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 9.

[emphasis added]
11.

"Liability can only be imposed when.•.defendant knew or

should have known of the condition. . ."
Decision of Judge Low, p. 9.
12.

See, TR at 833 - Memorandum

[emphasis added]

"Because there is no evidence that Smith's knew of the

cap coming free... summary judgment for Smith's is appropriate."
See, TR at 833 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 9.

[emphasis

added]
Those

citations

g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep
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the
iQ

Memorandum

Decision

make

it

abundantly clear that Judge Low simply misapplied the Canfield and
Schnuphase prong adopted by this Court - which prong wholly and
completely eliminates the obligation for notice to the merchant or
knowledge of the merchant in those select circumstances where the
merchant is in control of the dangerous instrumentality:
"We, therefore, reiterate the rule set forth
in De Weese, that where the store owner
chooses a method of operation where it is
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable
acts of third parties will create a dangerous
condition, an injured party need not prove
either actual or constructive knowledge of the
specific condition." Id. at 901. Canfield v.
Albertson's, Inc. , 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992 at 1225).
Judge Low also commented on the evidence presented:
"The testimony is uncontested that [Smith's]
did have a cleaning and maintenance program,
though not specifically focused on the track
of the door..." See TR at 828 - Memorandum
Decision of Judge Low, p. 4.
Smith's cleaning and maintenance policy for the rest of the
store is immaterial.

It was uncontested that there was no

maintenance, cleaning or upkeep policy whatsoever by Smith's
relative to the door itself. See, Record at 693, 695, 696, 737 and
738.

Whatever other maintenance and cleaning program might have

been used in the rest of the store is not central to the issues
before this Court.
Judge Low acknowledges:".. .that the door in question was under
the control of the defendant." Memorandum Decision of Judge Low at
p. 5, further acknowledges the possibility that dirt, ice, or other
contaminants "...may be the underlying cause of the door's failure.
There is not a showing that Smith's was ...aware of...that risk."
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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See, TR at 831 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 7.
By acknowledging that the control of the door was Smith's
responsibility, that the original purchase and installation of the
door was under the control of Smith's, and that the various factors
giving rise to the failure of the steel cap such as cleaning and
maintaining of the track were under the control of Smith's or its
agents, the Court should have correctly applied the applicable
standard set forth in Canfield and Schnuphase. The Court failed to
apply that standard to the facts of the present case. By applying
the wrong standard, prejudicial error was committed.
REPLY AS TO U.S. ALUMINUM,
CRITTENDEN PAINT AND GLASS,
CHAMBERLIN, AND R&O CONSTRUCTION
SMITH'S IS LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS AGENTS
In the ten page Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on May
7, 1996, two sentences are devoted collectively to the motions for
summary judgment filed by Crittenden Paint and Glass Company and
R&O

Construction.

U.S. Aluminum

received

one

sentence and

Chamberlin was dismissed summarily several months later. Virtually
the entire basis for granting summary judgment for these defendants
is focused on Smith's and its knowledge and behavior.

One can

conclude that the Court felt that if Smith's was entitled to
summary judgment, then the other defendants were likewise entitled.
In fact, that is precisely what the Court said:

"Largely for the

reasons above stated [the prior nine and a half pages] and for the
reason

set

forth

in

[the Memoranda

defendants], the same are granted."
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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submitted

by

the other

See, TR at 834 - Memorandum

Decision of Judge Low, pp. 10.
The Trial Court believed that if Mrs. McKay had no claim
against Smith's, then she had no claim against parties with whom
she had no connection, claim, or interest. However, if this Court
of Appeals reverses and remands the matter for trial to the
District Court as to Smith's it should likewise reverse and remand
as to all other defendants, inasmuch as the other defendants were
each acting as agents for Smith's.
liability

those

defendants

owed

The proportionate share of
to

Mrs. McKay

through

the

principal, Smith's, is an issue more appropriately determined by a
trier of fact at trial.
CONCLUSION
It is simply unreasonable to require a Plaintiff to visually
inspect each foot fall and to look continuously at the floor for
defects.

Mrs. McKay was entitled to assume that Smith's and its

agents had exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe for
her to return two videos rented from the store.

So long as she

exercised the prudence that an ordinarily careful person would use
in a like situation, she should be entitled to recompense for her
injuries.

There is a reasonable question of fact based upon the

unrebutted Affidavits submitted by Plaintiff, and the admissions by
Smith's and its agents.

The Trial Court utilized the standard

established in the first prong of cases described in Canfield and
Schnuphase when it should have used the second prong dealing with
foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition.

That fore-

seeability issue is amply addressed in the trial record.
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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The

decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and remanded.

g:\data\pi\mckay\appeal.rep
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Respectfully submitted
HH..LYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C.

Herm Olsen
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
*

STEPHANIE MCKAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

*
*
*

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 940000025

SMITH'S FOOD STORE AND DRUG
CENTERS INC., et al

*
*
*

Defendant.

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The hearing was conducted on March 25, 1996, and the

Court allowed additional time for filing of supplemental memoranda
and affidavits. However, the Court forgot that additional time was
allowed for such filing and had taken the matter under advisement
and issued a Memorandum Decision prior to Plaintiff's counsel
having the opportunity to supplement the record.

Upon realizing

the error, the Memorandum Decision then was set aside and the
matter thereafter reviewed afresh considering the supplemental
memoranda, affidavits, and documents supplied by the parties.
Having done so, the Court now reaffirms its earlier Memorandum
Decision.
In order to block a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party
against whom the Motion is brought must show that there exists
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There is no showing from the Plaintiff that in Smith's
ordering and installing of the door, even though it was perhaps not
specifically designed by the manufacturer for outdoor use,
contributed to the injury. More specifically, there is no showing
that Smith's was aware or had any reason to become aware of the
fact that the door was not designated for outdoor use or more
importantly, that its use in the location in the store was a breach
of duty to the Plaintiff.

What the Plaintiff has shown by expert

opinion is the mechanism by which, or how, the door track failed
and why it failed.
The Plaintiff has suggested that the Defendant had a duty of
ordinary care toward her in selecting, installing, and maintaining
the door track in question. That is true, but there is nothing to
indicate that ordering and installing a door, even if it was
designed for inside use only, was in fact a negligent act. It must
be shown that the duty was one that could or should have been known
to the Defendant and that the duty was breached.

There is nothing

herein to indicate that the Defendant should have known that the
door was an inappropriate door or even if Defendant did, that it
was subject to the type of problems experienced. There was nothing
to show if in fact the raising of the stainless steel cap was
caused by an ice wedge and that the Defendant knew or should have
known that would result. There is no showing that, if in fact the
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by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and
realizes that it involves unreasonable risk or harm to invitees.
The undisputed facts contain no evidence that the Defendant knew,
should have known, or by reasonable care could have discovered the
condition which apparently caused the injury to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant has cited both English v. Kienke 848 P. 2d 153
(Utah 1993) and Laws v. Blandina Citv. 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (cited?) . It is settled that the Defendant, though it may
have a high duty of care to invitees, is not strictly liable to
injuries occurring to the invitee.

Additionally, Plaintiff

distinguishs slip and fall cases such as related to food or things
of that nature on a floor caused by third parties as opposed to
dangerous conditions under the exclusive control of, or caused or
created by, the Defendant as to the issue of negligence and the
standard to be applied.

Here, there is no question that the door

in question was under the control of the Defendant. That does not,
however, indicate in and of itself, that in fact a dangerous
condition came into existence for which the Defendant is liable.
Strict liability is not the standard for possessors or owners of
land in Utah.

The issue is still before the Court as to whether

the unsafe condition was known or should have been known by
exercise of reasonable care on the part of Defendant Smith's and

-

^
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been anticipated and was a contributing factor in its failure", is
insufficient to refer the matter to a jury. That, if the Defendant
did not carefully keep the tracks or grooves of the doors clean at
all times which may have allowed rocks, ice, and debris to interact
with the traffic of the doors resulting in deformation of the
product, does not demonstrate negligence. Plaintiff must show that
failure to do so should have suggested to Smith's that the same
involved unreasonable risk and harm to the invitees. There simply
is no evidence that if the door was designed for interior use only
that Smith's knew of that fact or that installing such door in an
exterior location would involve unreasonable risk or harm to
invitees.
More specifically, with respect to whether the door failed as
a result of dirt, ice or other contaminates, though that may be the
underlying cause of the door's failure, there is not a showing that
Smith's was or could have been reasonably aware of, or reasonably
foreseen, that risk.

No warning was provided to Smith's nor has

there been any reason shown that a reasonable person should
understand that ice, dirt, debris or heavy loads would cause the
type of damage to the door which occurred.

Under the facts here

shown, Smith's had no reason to know of the existence of a steel
cap much less that it might fail under conditions of dirt, ice,
debris or heavy loads. Again, the burden is -on the Plaintiff to
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become loose and cause a hazard to the Plaintiff.

The Court can

only conclude that accepting the Plaintiff's theory in this matter
would seek to hold the Defendant liable for any defect on the
premise regardless whether Smith's had any reason to know of the
actual hazard or that its activity may contribute to the hazard and
would in fact require the store owner to be strictly liable and
place the store owner in a position of insurer.
standard.

That is not the

If it were the standard, then Plaintiff would be

entitled to summary judgment in her favor on the issue of liability
and there would be no issue except for damages for the trier of
fact.

Plaintiff is not entitled under the case law to a summary

judgment because this is not a strict liability case, it is one of
negligence and the Plaintiff is unable to show that her injuries,
as severe as they may be, were caused by negligent acts of the
Defendant.

Liability can only be imposed when there is some

evidence that the Defendant knew or should have known of the
condition and realized that it posed an unreasonable risk of harm
to its patrons. Because there is no evidence that Smith's knew of
the cap coming free or it should have known of the dangers of the
cap coming free, summary judgment for Smith's is appropriate. As
pointed out by the Defendant's Memorandum, to submit this matter to
the jury would require the jury to speculate that the Defendant
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